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Preface 
This paper is a slightly revised-version of a .Report-with the same 
title submitted to the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development in 
January, 1969. 
The study was begun at short notice, and was to be completed within 
a two month period which included Christmas and the New Year. The short 
time available for the study, and the time of year in which it was carried 
out, meant that much of the data collected on air freight and customs duties 
on air freight may not have been fully representative of the data for the 
full year. However, the data sources are given, and can be followed up in 
future if desired. 
The present version differs from the original in omitting references 
to confidential material, incorporating additional information on air-
freighted imports and in containing a slightly expanded and hopefully 
clearer exposition of the appropriate valuation of air freighted imports 
for duty purposes. 
This discussion paper is being issued to make available to the public 
an economic analysis of some of the general issues in the air freight/landing 
rights/customs duty fields, and not to provide information on the existing 
situation of particular carriers. For this reason, we have made no attempt to 
report on or to evaluate changes in landing rights or on the outcome of 
negotiations which have occurred since January. 
We wish to thank all of those persons who co-operated with us in gather-
ing data. These have included representatives of almost all airlines serving 
Nairobi, of I.A.T.A., of I.C.A.O., of the major horticultural exporters, of 
the main freight forwarding firms, and of motor, pharmaceutical and 
photographic firms. Personnel of the Kenya Export Promotion Council, the 
Ministries of Power and Communications, of Commerce and Industry, Economic 
Planning and Development, Agriculture and Finance were most helpful. 
Officials of the E.A. Civil Aviation Board, E.A. Directorate of Civil Aviation, 
E.A. Statistics Department, and E.A. Customs and Excise have also provided 
important assistance. We have drawn more heavily on the time of high-level 
manpower of East African Airways than any other organisation, and would like 
to give special thanks to that organisation. We have acquired a great 
EAA for 
amount of sympathy with/the conditions under which it must operate. We 
hope that this is clear inspite of some particular criticisms which are 
made or implied in the Report and Appendices. 
The two I.D.S. authors would like to express their gratitude to Mr. 
Muturi for his extremely efficient organisation of interviews and data 
collection and his willingness to work on files and contribute to interviews 
long after office hours as well as during them. 
Finally, this version has benefitted from the comments of Mr. E. R. 
Rado and Dr. John Harris, who are therefore in part responsible for any 
analytical errors and expository obscurities still remaining. 
Summary of Recommendations 
1. The backlog of freight to Zambia must and can be eliminated immediately. 
EAA is negotiating for an agreement with Zambia Air Cargoes to handle 
the situation. In the meantime, the Alitalia freighter which departs 
Nairobi-Lusaka each week with over 9,000 kilos of empty capacity due 
to a lack of pick-up rights should be given those rights oh a temporary 
basis until/EAA/ZAC agreement comes into effect. Once the EAA/ZAC flight 
is operating, the Alitalia freighter should be given temporary rights9 
on a week-to-week basis, to pick up any back-log of cargo in that week. 
Kenya exporters should be assured by Government that this will be done 
so they can seek regular markets in Zambia with the confidence that 
they will be able to supply them. 
2. Should Air France apply for temporary cargo pick-up rights Nairobi-
Paris for an all freight plane for 8 flights commencing February 
these should be granted. 
3. In any week in which there is a back-log of freight to Europe, or in 
which horticultural exporters are unable to secure enough space, the 
SAS and Zambia Airways flights which presently stop in Nairobi but have 
no pick-up rights Nairobi-Europe should be given those rights for 
freight only. 
Some Government organisation should be responsible for continuously 
checking the need for temporary landing rights. Since this involves 
continuous checking with various manufacturers, horticultural exporters 
and freight forwarding agents, it would seem to require attention by 
a body connected with all of the economic Ministries. This might become 
a function of the interministerial committee on freight rates. 
5. A proper study of the economics of landing rights, preferably on an 
East African basis, should be commissioned. The current criteria, 
basic principles, and evaluations of applications appear to us to be 
deficient. It would be desirable if Kenya's position on particular 
Bilateral negotiations were discussed by a body of the economic 
Ministries and the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife. 
6. We do not recommend any early change in the way imports by air are 
valued for customs purposes. It is possible that such a change may be 
desirable later. If so, the change should be made for a very restricted 
list of commodities and not for all imports by air.. 
7. The East African Statistical Department should ask airlines to give 
the space available (unused) on each flight leaving each East African 
airport in addition to the information already filed by the airlines. 
This would make it possible to secure estimates of full (passenger + 
freight) load-factors and would improve the accuracy of future 
evaluations of the capacity situation as well as the analysis of 
particular landing rights applications. 
8. We would recommend that EAA be made a member of the Kenya Export 
Promotion Council. Given the mutual interests of these two bodies 
in increasing Kenya's exports, this move, by facilitating increased 
communication of each others! difficulties, would reduce the mis-
understandings which currently exist and might result in increased 
future co-operation in expanding Kenya's experts. 
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REPORT OF THE AIR FREIGHT STUDY GROUP 
Terms of Reference and Introduction 
1. The chain of argument we were asked to examine is: 
(i) with more air freight space, Kenyan horticultural exports would 
significantly increase; 
(ii) with a reduction in the duty levied on the airfreight element of 
"" of the cif value of imports, imports by airfreight would increa&e, 
(iii) with more imports, airlines would provide additional airfreight 
capacity into, and hence out of,Nairobi. 
2. This chain of reasoning is defective because it lacks mention of landing 
rights: 
(i) a greater willingness of the airlines to provide more service will 
result in more capacity only if they are granted landing rights 
for more flights; 
(ii) without the inducement of increased imports the airlines are 
willing to supply more capacity now but have not been granted 
the landing rights to do so. 
3. We have examined (a) the capacity problem (b) the question of landing 
and 
rights, and (c) the question of a tariff change. Appendices A,B,/_ C .contain 
the detailed analysis of these three questions. This report is a summary 
of our findings. 
Does airfreight space constrain horticultural exports? 
4. To Zambia there is currently, and has been for some months, a backlog of 
freight at the Nairobi airport. During the month from mid-December, 1968 
to mid-January, 1969, this varied between .9 tons and 12.'9 tons, averaging 
4.5. tons. The "true" backlog is considerably larger since exporters do 
not bother to' take goods- (particularly perishables) to the airport if they 
will not get on a plane. This shortage of capacity affects'not only 
horticultural products, but also beef and pork products and several 
manufactured goods. 
5. There is no excuse for this to have happened and persisted to the extent 
it has. We recommend that the Government take an interest in the current 
negotiations between EAA and Zambia Air Cargoes to ensure that the 
additional 20 tonnes of weekly freight capacity involved are put into 
service if at all possible. We also recommend that the Alitalia freighter 
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be given "fcQHipG£>as"y landing arigh-to "Co carry freight: Maiiv>i>i-Zambia until 
the EAA/ZAC plane is flying , and that this freighter be given temporary 
rights on a week to week basis thereafterto pick up any backlog of cargo 
for Zambia which still exists. 
6. To Europe (including the U.K.) horticultural exports (by weight) have 
decreased during the last two years. There does not appear to be any serious 
capacity constraint at present. 
7. In the longer run, some persons in the horticultural industry claim that 
there would be significant increases in sales if more freight space were 
available since a guarantee of this availability would result in increased 
planting by farmers and increased demand when it became known that Kenya 
could supply more. We have not examined the validity of this claim. The 
forthcoming studies by the Tropical Products Institute and Mr. Frank Wilson 
of the Institute for Development Studies of long run horticultural demand 
and supply prospects should shed light on it. 
8. At present, the Kenya Government has the power to grant landing rights which 
would permit an immediate minimum increase in peak month horticultural 
•exports of 55% (over the 1967/68 level). This could be accomplished without 
issuing any rights for passenger uplift, and without granting rights to 
carry inward bound cargo or mail. (See recommendations 2 and 3 p. 3). We 
presume that this situation will persist for at least the next year or two. 
Horticulturalists should be assured that the Kenya Government will exercisc this 
power (or have it exercised by the Community) should the need arise. 
9. To other destinations (other Africa, Middle and Far East). 
We have not made a detailed study of the capacity-situation to other points. 
Enquiries to the relevant carriers, exporters, and the Kenya Export 
Promotion Council on the cargo situation to these points generated no evidence 
of capacity shortages. It has been suggested, however, that exports to 
other African countries could be considerably increased with lower freight 
rates. As well, there appears to be a need for more aggressive selling 
efforts by exporters and airlines. 
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Should Policy on the Issue of Landing Rights be Changed? 
10. Appendix B discusses landing rights in some detail. To summarise the find-
ings of that Appendix, 
(a) there may be considerable room for improving the flow of information 
on landing rights applications between the Community and partner 
East African Governments. As well, there is scope for increased 
communication among the Kenya economic ministries on this issue. 
(b) there appears to be an excess demand for landing rights at present. 
That is, airlines would like to have rights to operate more services 
in and out of Nairobi. 
(c) the past criteria used to evaluate applications for landing rights have 
been too restrictive. In particular, we believe that more could be 
done to increase the gains to Kenya - and East Africa - from granting 
landing rights. Individual applications are susceptible to more 
economic analysis, than has been the case in the past. It is also 
probable that more gains can be secured through negotiating more limited 
bundles of rights than hitherto (i.e. considering and negotiating rights 
to pick up passengers, mail and freight separately), and through 
negotiating on more items than a simple reciprocal exchange of rights 
which has been the main item for discussion up to now. In the context 
of the airfreight issue, it may be possible to induce more freighters 
to come to East Africa, if required, by tying the grant of rights for 
passenger flights to the requirement that freighter services also be 
introduced. 
(d) the conditions under which more members join the Community will have 
important implications for the gains to present Community members, and 
•particularly to Kenya, in the landing rights field. 
11. We therefore recommend that the subject of landing rights come in for more 
extended analysis, from the point of view of both East Africa and of Kenya. 
Recommendations on particular applications for landing rights are given else-
where in this Report (see Summary of recommendations paragraphs 1,2,3.) 
Should the Customs Valuation of Air Freight be Changed? 
12. In 1968, £521,686 in customs revenue were collected at the Nairobi airport' 
on imports to Kenya. We estimate that £109,000 - £114,000 of this consisted 
of duty on the air freight element of cif value. Additional duty was paid 
on air freighted imports by parcel post, and imports paying customs duties 
at bonded warehouses in Nairobi. Any policy changes in this area therefore 
involve important revenue considerations. 
13. It has been argued that levying duty cif leads to inefficiency in choosing 
between air and sea freight. This argument is based on the fact that because 
air freight charges are so much higher than sea freight charges, the duty levied 
on the freight element of cif costs is much higher for air than sea imports. 
This. is alleged "to lead. some importers who would, choose air importation 
were their commodities non-dutiable to choose sea importation when their 
commodities are subject to (ad valorem) duty. This argument is wrong. Ad 
valorem duties are paid on the.full costs of imported goods. (This 
proposition and the minor exceptions to it are demonstrated in Appendix C 
paras 5-7.) This means that the cheapest means of importing pre-tax will 
also be the cheapest means of importing after tax, if a single duty rate 
applies to all cost elements, as is the case under cif customs valuation. 
This analytical conclusion is confirmed by the evidence we have been able 
to collect. Reducing the duty on air freight relative to sea freight would 
therefore discriminate in favour of air and against sea freight. This 
would, subject to the qualification in the next paragraph, lead to a waste 
of resources. The explanation of this fact is simple. The social or 
real or resource cost of supplying a given import demand consists of' the • 
private cost (the cost incurred by importers) less the duty paid. If 
duties on air freight were reduced, some importers would switch from sea to 
air, since air importation would then become cheaper to importers relative 
to sea importation. But the fall in importers' costs would consist entirely 
of the reduction in import duties. The other costs of the switching import 
would rise (otherwises the import would have come by air in the first place). 
Since these other costs represent real costs, the real cost of supplying a 
given final demand for imports would rise. 
Insofar as some airfreighted imports come by EAA, we would ideally like to 
have EAA's airfreight charges inside the duty wall rather than outside it 
as at present. Putting EAA inside the wall would require subjecting its 
services to excise taxation, partially offsetting the tax decrease from 
customs exemption. Since it is not possible to separate EAA from other 
airlines,, there is a case for reducing the tariff charges on airfreight, 
but not in our opinion, to a large enough extent to justify the administrative 
changes this would require. (EAA had approximately 20% of the capacity 
for carrying imports from Europe in 1967/68.) 
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15. If it is desired to subsidise inward bound airfreight in order to increase 
capacity for exports, duty changes provide one means of doing this. In 
view of the fact (mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 9 above), that increased 
capacity for exports to destinations presently or reputedly suffering capacity 
shortages can be secured with no subsidy at all, any move at present to 
alter duty rates for this reason is unnecessary. Such a subsidy might be 
desirable in the future. If so, we would recommend that no across-the-board 
changes in customs valuation be considered. Rather, we recommend that the 
desired increase in capacity be secured at the minimum possible decrease in 
customs revenues. This implies changing the valuation of particular 
commodities. The commodities chosen should (a) be coming mainly by sea 
before the. duty change, and (b) should be capable of providing a large sea-
air switch in response to a customs valuation ehange. Examples of such 
commodities are motor spares and pharmaceuticals and cosmetics. (We cal-
culate the likely effects of a duty change on motor spares in Appendix C, 
paras 24-33.) 
16. Changes in air-freight rates are similar, so far as importers are concerned, 
to changes in duty rates on air freight. . Both change the costs facing importers, 
However, an air freight rate reduction also reduces the cost to the economy 
of its imports. It is shown in Appendix C that if duty rates are reduced, 
probably 
the airlines will/have an incentive to raise rather than lower freight rates. 
This would vitiate the objectives of a duty reduction. 
l7„ Freight rates are set at Conferences of the International Air Transport 
Association. They are difficult, but not impossible for Government to 
influence. The most effective policy tool for influencing- freight rates 
(and passenger fares), is probably general landing rights policy (see Appendix 
special quidelines 
B). However,/policy/with respect to applications for landing rights by airlines 
which are known to oppose reductions in freight rates on East African routes 
might also be useful. As well, it may be possible to exert some influence 
through moral suasion (which might become more effective in the context of 
a proposed customs duty change). 
w § » 
Appendix A: Capacity Situation 
General Framework for Analysis 
1. Providing a quantitative evaluation of the capacity situation is made 
difficult by the complications of airline operation and the paucity of 
appropriate data. The general situation can be described qualitatively, 
however, and the description can be supported by evidence which reflects 
the true position. There are three general situations which we can 
distinguish: 
(i) there may be sufficient capacity that all shipments find 
space on flights proceeding directly to the desired destination 
(where such service is available); 
(ii) It is necessary to make use of trans-shipments and short-
term unexpected shipments do not always find space; 
(iii) Capacity is not available to- carry all freight which can be 
regularly expected to move so that goods of export quality must 
regularly be sold on the local market or are not produced at 
all. 
Being in situation (ii) rather than (i) reflects a loss of revenue due both 
to lost sales and to a decrease in the quality of products which do reach 
the market. However, the loss is probably not very large. Being in 
situation (iii) implies the loss of considerable export earnings. 
2. We shall detail below our evidence for the conclusion that situation 
(iii) holds for exports to Zambia, while (i) and occasionally (ii) holds 
for European exports at the current structure of freight charges. The 
underlined expression is extremely important since the amount of cargo 
shippers wish to send by air depends on price. The airlines have frequently 
made reductions in freight charges for commodities where they felt substan-
tial increases in amounts shipped by aircou^'be induced. (This question 
of freight charges is extremely important for exports to other African 
countries as well). 
3. Before turning to the details of our analysis of capacity to particular 
destinations we shall discuss the problems of measurement. On the demand 
side no figures are published (or kept) on the amounts of cargo turned away 
at the airport or not sent due to lack of space. It is possible for 
exporters, shippers and ..airlines to keep day to-day records of this 
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Table I BACKLOG OF AIR CARGO DESTINED FOR ZAMBIA 
AT NAIROBI AIRPORT, (KILOS) 
FREIGHT OF IN TRANSIT FROM TOT a T KENYA ORIGIN OTHER COUNTRIES 1 Ul-nJj 
Monday, December 16 530.6 3,583.0 4,113.6 
Tuesday December 17 1,222,5 1,314.5 2,537.0 
Wednesday December 18 2,258.0 4,278.5 6,536.5 
Thursday, December 19 2,478.5 4,556.5 7,035.0 
Friday, December 20 2,327.0 4,756.5 7,083.5 
Monday, December 23 227.0 2,103.5 2,330.5 
Tuesday December 24 229.0 4.516.5 4,-815.5 
Friday, December 27 447.5 6,030.5 6,478.0 
Monday, December 30 72.5 1,313.0 1,385.5 
Tuesday December 31 576.5 3,298.5 3,875.0 
Thursday, January 2 107.0 1,446.0 1,553.0 
Friday, January 3 - 1,747.0 1,747.0 
Monday, January 6 - 852.0 852.0 
Tuesday, January 7 4,053.0 2,837.5 6,890.5 
Wednesday, January 8 688.5 430.5 1,119.0 
Thursday, January 9 83.0 1,069.0 1,152.0 
Friday, January 10 1,593.0 2,779.5 4,372.5 
Monday, January 13 225.0 3,662.0 3,887.0 
Tuesday, January 14 4,505.5 2,704.3 7,209.8 
Wednesday, January 15 3,581.5 2,548.5 6,130.0 
Thursday, January 17 6,912.5 5,953.5 12,866.0 
Mean per day for which 
records are available 1,533 2,942 4,475 
SOURCE: Manager, E.A.A. Air Cargo Shed, Embakasi. 
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expect to be able to get space and because alternative modes of transport 
are too expensive, uncertain, or incapable of handling perishable commodities. 
Further, exporters use alternative transport which is less satisfactory at 
current prices than air, were regular air services available. If account is 
taken of the unlikelihood in the near future of Zambia's 'natural' suppliers 
(Rhodesia and South Africa) of a wide range of commodities which are produced 
in Kenya (from biscuits to meat to dry ice to clothing to fruit and vegetables) 
becoming more acceptable sources of supply, together with the competitiveness 
of economically feasible Special Commodity Rates for some of these goods to 
Zambia, there is no doubt that the 'true' shortage of airfreight capacity 
to Zambia is a substantial multiple of the observed shortage. It should 
also be pointed out that sending an occasional chartered freighter is a poor 
substitute for regularly available capacity when it comes to developing export 
markets. 
6. East African Airways has been aware of this problem for some time, although 
•they have made urgent attempts to solve it only recently. EAA is attempting 
to negotiate an agreement with Zambia Air Cargos for a weekly service Dar-
Mombasa-Nairobi-Ndola by a Lockheed Hercules with 20 tonnes capacity. (This 
freighter carries copper from Ndola to Dar). We recommend that the Kenya 
Government keep in close touch with these negotiations. As well, the weekly 
BUA freighter from the end of January will have roughly five tonnes more capacity 
than at present, and some of this may be available to Kenya exporters. 
7. In the meantime, the Alitalia freighter which has the route Rome -
(Mogadishu) - Nairobi - Lusaka - Nairobi - Tripoli - Rome, and which carries 
15-20 tonnes of KMC beef to Tripoli each week, lacks the right to pick up 
cargo from Nairobi to Zambia. It could have taken over 9,000 kilos of cargo 
each week in December. In order to clear the backlog at Nairobi for Zambia, 
and in order to develop the airfreight market between Nairobi and Zambia, 
we recommend that this freighter should be given temporary rights to pick up 
cargo at Nairobi until such time as EAA/ZAC is ready to begin operations. 
8. We suspect that in the medium term enough business will develop on 
this route to utilise the space available on the Alitalia freighter, the 
BUA freighter and the EAA/ZAC plane if the latter is secured. We therefore 
believe that the Government should assure exporters that the Alitalia 
freighter will automatically be granted rights on a weekly basis to pick 
up any backlog for Zambia. Someone in the Ministry of Economic Planning 
and Development, Power and Communications or Commerce and Industry, or 
some interested group, should have the duty of regularly checking the back-
log situation to all points by telephoning the Manager of Air Cargo shed 
(Mr. Kaingu) at the airport and of assuring exporters that space will be 
made available. 
9. While we deal with the general issue of landing rights in more detail 
below, it is worthwhile mentioning here the strong objection which EAA has 
to the granting of temporary landing rights (except for tourist charters). 
They feel that granting of rights on a week to week basis to handle back-
logs as suggested above will provide the foreign operator with the "thin 
end of the wedge" to extract more permanent rights. There is no reason why 
temporary rights need be anything but temporary. Part of the EAA objection 
arises from their feeling that the foreign operator will succeed in develop-
ing new business and signing long-term contracts which will force the 
Government to make those rights permanent. If such potential business 
exists, and if EAA, for reasons of lack of skilled personnel, of commercial 
drive, of insufficient aircraft, or general inefficiency is unable to exploit 
it, Kenya's interests are hardly hurt and may be better served than expectcd 
by the granting of temporary landing rights. 
10. Finally, with respect to the Alitalia freighter, it should be noted 
that it is the hope of Alitalia to increase the amount of through cargo 
Europe/Zambia and to reduce the amount of cargo presently off-loaded at 
Nairobi. The former tends to be more profitable than the.latter. This 
means that the ''thin end of the wedge' argument has less relevance for 
this flight than might otherwise be the case since they would expect to 
decrease their carriage from Nairobi to Zambia even if given Nairobi pick-
up rights. 
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Airfreight to Europe : The Current Situation 
11. We shall begin by reviewing the overall situation in air traffic 
between Nairobi and Europe before turning to the excess capacity question. 
Tables II and III show the amount of aircargo and mail (in tonnes) arriving 
from and departing to the U.K. and. Continental Europe from Nairobi and 
East Africa in the years 1961 to 1967, and for the year July, 1967 to June, 
1968. As will be seen from the table, there is no significant excess of 
outward bound traffic over inward bound traffic on this sector on an annual 
basis. 
Table II AIR CARGO WITH ORIGIN/DESTINATION UK-EUROPE/KENYA, 
('000 KILOS) 
Arriving Departing 
1961 1-162 1,103 
1962 1,127 1,295 
1963 1,398 1,727 
1964 1,694 2,016 
1965 1,638 2,314 
1966 2,002 2,736 
1967 2,122 2,676 
1967/8 2,515 2,704 
SOURCE: E.A. Statistical Department. 
Table III AIR CARGO WITH ORIGIN/DESTINATION UK-EUROPE/EAST 
AFRICA (J000 KILOS.) 
Arriving Departing 
1961 1,330 1.166 
1962 1,469 1,423 
1963 1,819 2,008 
1964 2,14.8 2,296 
1965 2,181 2,761 
1966 2,623 3,384 
1967 3,116- 3,607 
1967/8 3,742 3,497 
SOURCE: E.A. Statistical Department. 
12. Table IV shows, the situation for the months of 1967/68 and the numbers 
are illustrated in Chart I. As the Chart makes clear, the annual figures 
conceal excess of.inward cargo-over-outward cargo-for five-months and"the 
reverse in seven months. It should be noted that these figures refer to 
cargo and-mail only. Since.passengers and baggage took roughly three times 
the weight of freight and mail, we have an inadequate view for considering 
relative-total capacities in each direction. (The problem was of disentangling 
passengers on chartered aircraft from those on aircraft carrying freight and 
also disentangling the effect of the. Asian exodus to arrive at "normal" : 
figures.) However, these are the appropriate data for considering all 
freight aircraft as we do below. - - -
13. In February inward bound freight was 67% of outward and in April 81%. 
These are., the lowest figures which this ratio had during the year considered. 
The February figure was probably affected by the Asian exodus, so there is 
not a very great imbalance in shipments even on a month by month basis. 
14.. As was pointed out earlier, it is extremely difficult- to secure 
estimates of air freight capacity. We have t::o. The' Board of' Airline 
representatives had all airlines which" fly North provide estimates of the 
amount of capacity they had for freight (excluding mail) on Scheduled services 
ex East Africa in a Northern direction during the year July 1967 to June 
1968. After removing those flights which would appear, in the E.A. Statisti-
cal Department figures for freight moved under other destinations, adding 
the BUA freighter (which was not included in the estimate) and 'deducting 
10% to take care of transit cargo, this figure .came to 4,6j52 tonnes of 
capacity .... The other ..estimate , from a knowledgeable airline cargo represen-
tative, is-for Northbound flights from Nairobi at the present time. This 
comes to 130-175 tonnes per week,' (depending upon weather, transit traffic, 
and so on) or 6,760-9,100 tonnes periyear. Deducting.flights.not flying 
to Europe and deducting., recent additions to capacity (such as the Alitalia 
freighter) in order to get a figure comparable with that above for East 
Africa, we secure an estimate of 90-112 tonnes per week for an annual total 
of 4,680-5,824 tonnes (for cargo + mail). If we subtract from the B.A.R. 
figure the capacity on flights from the other two East African airports 
which either do not stop or do not have pick-up rights in Nairobi, we find 
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Table IV AIR CARGO WITH ORIGIN/DESTINATION UK-EUROPE/KENYA-
EAST AFRICA - JULY 1967 - JUNE 1968. •  !000 KILOS 
KENYA EAST AFRICA 
Arrive Depart Arrive Depart 
July 180 199 251 256 
August 183 168 268 205 
September 204 187 293 205 
October 223 176 337 230 
November 212 .207 337 283 . 
December 221 259 333 345 
J anuary 213 254 319 373 
February 191 284 312 357 
March 247 283 357 • 349 
April 234 276 324 363 
May 228 252 316 393 
June 189 160 294 240 
2,514 2,704 3,742 3,599 
SOURCE:' E.A. Statistical Department. 
Table V 
'000 Kilos Percentages 
Month 
i 
Horticultural Exports to Total Cargo 
to Europe 
Horticultural Exports as 





i 1966 1967 1968 1967 1968 1967 1968 1967 
& 
1968 
January 155 177 142 152 135 254 
"0 
53% 
February 164 138 160 128 151 284 53 
March 185 169 136 156 127 283 45 
April 160 147 146 139 139 276 50 
May 129 127 139 118 132 252 52 
June 114 133 84 116 82 160 51 
July 71 85 67 82 62 199 41 
August 80 66 79 58 61 168 35 
September 110 79 80 65 64 187 35 
October 116 90 115 83 95 176 47 
November 149 125 160 116 129 207 56 
December 173 174 184 161 155 259 62 
Year 1,606 1510 1492 1374 1332 Annual Average 
1967/8 = 49% 
* Total, less exports to Aden and "Other" 
SOURCE: .East African Statistical Department, Kenya Ministry of 
Agriculture. 

that the two capacity measures are roughly comparable. The sketchiness of 
these calculations re-emphasizes the need for better data. 
15. If we assume that mail accounted for 15% of the tonnes of cargo moved 
(this was the percentage of mail in all cargo moved arriving and departing 
from the major East African airports in 1S55 and 1956), cargo net of mail 
moving North came to 3,023 tonnes in 1967/8. This implies a cargo load-
cactor of 65% in that period on the B.A.R. figure. This is probably about 
the maximum achievable. (If an 80% load-factor represents full capacity 
utilization on a monthly basis, and given the monthly pattern of air freight 
movements in 1967/8, and assuming that capacity serving the peak month must 
serve throughout the year, the maximum annual load-factor achievable would 
come to 64%.) If charters are available to carry peak month loads, of cours 
the annual load-factors on schedule - carriers could be higher. We might als 
point out that the capacity usage figure and the maximum load factor figure 
would be larger if mail were included, and these would be the right figures 
for evaluating whether to put on a freighter which would have mail rights. 
16. It is also worth noting that different airlines have different load-
factors at present. These arise from better service and more strenuous 
promotion efforts by some air lines, as well as, perhaps, preferences of 
nationals to use their own national carriers. 
The Problems of Horticulture 
17. Horticultural products are the lowest paying type of cargo (they move 
to the U.K. at a rate which is only 20% of the General Commodity Rate) and 
hence are less attractive to the airlines than other freight. They are 
also the largest single type of commodity (in terms of weight) exported 
from Kenya to Europe by air (See Table V), accounting for 49% of such 
exports in 1967/68 with a maxim-cm of 62% in the peak month (December) of 
1967 and a minimum of 35% (in August and September, 1967). Hence, we would 
expect any shortages of airfreight capacity generally to manifest themselves 
in off-loading of, or inability to make bookings for, horticultural products. 
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18. On a year to year basis,, horticultural air exports have fallen between 
1966 and 1967 and between 1967 and 1968.. (See table V). While this fall is 
consistent with the general complaint in the horticultural export industry 
that there is a shortage of freight capacity for their goods at peak seasons 
and at peak days of- the week, this is not necessarily the case. In 
order to assess this situation, we asked the Manager of the EAA Air Cargo 
shed at Embakasi, and the major horticultural exporters j_ E.A. Growers, Kenya 
Horticultural Exporters-, Horticultural Co-operative Union, and Como Coffee 
Co. (pineapples_)/ to record for us, on a daily basis, the amount of horticul-
tural cargo off-loaded, and the amount not shipped due to an inability to 
make air bookings. Apart from one shipment on the first Saturday in December 
which was put on to a later flight, air freight space imposed no limitations 
on horticultural exports in December, 1968. Since the peak month for 
horticultural exports to Europe in the last two years has been December (See 
Table V), this indicates that the problem is not, at present, serious. 
19. According to the trade, several shipments of horticultural produce were 
off-loaded earlier in 1968 and some were shipped by very indirect routes (e.g. 
via Lagos or Karachi). Some at least of these off-loadings are probably to 
be accounted for by the coincidence of the Asian exodus with the peak season 
for horticultural exports. 
20. It has been argued that the true capacity needs of the horticultural 
exporters cannot be observed from the current•situation since both planting. 
by farmers and demand by European importers have adjusted to a capacity shortage 
situation. It has been argued by Mr. Philip of HCDA that horticultural exports 
would increase by two to three times the current level of £5 million with 
unlimited space availability. It is on this basis that he argues for a 
tariff change. As discussed in Appendix C, this represents an expensive . 
subsidy. It must therefore be asked whether and by how much the situation can 
be improved by other means. 
21. With increased demand of the size postulated by HCDA, an Air France 
freighter presently flying Malagassy-Djibouti-Paris almost empty would be 
made available to land at Nairobi. In addition, Government could grant tem-
porary rights to SAS and Zambia Airways to uplift freight for Europe on flights 
which already stop here but do not have pick-up rights. These three flights 
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together have capacity of 22-28 tonnes per week or over 88-112 tonnes per 
month (depending on weather conditions etc.) This represents 62-79% of the 
average monthly horticultural exports during the 1967/8 high season (taken 
as-December through May)3 and 55-70% of the highest single monthly total in 
that period (December, See table V.) Addition of these flights would provide 
sufficient capacity increase for exporters to demonstrate some of the postulated 
increase. Granting rights to these flights would also have the desirable 
feature of resulting in no additional competition for EAA on inbound flights, 
and minimal competition on outbound ones. 
22. In future, it will be necessary to decide whether to bring in additional 
freighter aircraft Europe-Nairobi-Europe. Our sample of air waybills at the 
airport in early January showed an average freight charge of around shs. 
12.20 per kilo on all commodities originating in Europe. If an all freight 
aircraft were to fly South with a 60% load-factor it would earn shs. 7.32 
per kilo of capacity. (The figure of 60% was chosen to.be conservative compared 
with 65% of 1967/68.) 
With a special commodity rate of shs 3 per kilo on horticultural exports going 
North, and assuming that it goes 100% full in the peak month,.and that the 
seasonal pattern is the same in future as it was in 1967/68, the freighter will 
earn shs 2.60 per kilo of capacity going North. The total earnings per round 
trip will come on these assumptions to shs. 9.92 per kilo capacity over the 
high season (December-May). This compares with a figure of shs 8-10 per kilo 
of round trip capacity.necessary to induce a charter aircraft to fly Europe-
Nairobi-Europe, or to induce an airline to put on a regular freighter. Thus 
it would appear that large policy adjustments would not be necessary to induce 
new all freight aircraft if horticultural exports to Europe should rise. This 
conclusion is further supported by the fact that three airlines (PAA, B0AC, 
Lufthansa) are seriously considering bringing all freight aircraft to East 
Africa. 
23. To summarise: we see little need for action at present. There is a need 
for the Government to stand ready to take advantage of existing possibilities 
for quick additions to capacity as outlined in para 21 should demand rise. 
Equally important, Government should assure the relevant firms of its intention 
to act on capacity problems should they arise in future. 
Appendix B: Landing Rights 
Introduction 
1. A consideration of landing rights is fundamental to any consideration 
of the air freight capacity problem. If more airlines wish to run services 
out of Nairobi, but are unable to secure rights to do so, the simplest means 
of increasing capacity is to issue those rights. (See our particular recommend-
ations in Appendix A for examples.) By the same token, it is pointless for 
Government to change the basis of valuing imports to make Nairobi more attrac-
tive to freighter aircraft if it does not simultaneously grant rights for the 
additional aircraft to land here. After a brief, and extremely tentative, 
mention of some adininistrative problems, this Appendix contains a discussion 
of criteria for approving applications for landing rights. 
The Legal and Administrative Position 
2. Bilateral Air Services Agreements are negotiated between Governments 
which then, subject to the conditions in the agreements, nominate the carriers 
which will enjoy the landing rights negotiated. It is also possible for 
airlines to secure temporary landing rights by negotiating with the Govern-
ment concerned. In East Africa, since air services are a Community matter, 
negotiations are carried out by Community bodies. Temporary landing rights 
are issued by the E.A. Civil Aviation Board. Briefs for negotiations of 
B.A.S. Agreements are approved by the Communications Council and hence by 
the Governments. The negotiations .themselves are conducted by a Committee 
of the Communications Council. To become effective, Bilateral Air Services 
Agreements must be initialled by the East African Governments. 
3. It is essential that the East African Governments be kept abreast of 
applications for negotiations. As well, within each country, it is 
important that the ''economic ministries" be kept up to date on the status 
of applications and negotiations. We have, not had time to go into how well 
these requirements are met in detail. However, we have accumulated some 
impressions which we believe should be followed up. 
4. The C.A.B. appears to work efficiently, without undue delays. 
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5. Applications for Bilateral Air Services Agreements which are lodged by-
foreign Governments with the Community and with the individual Ministries 
of Foreign Affairs may not be communicated to Community partners and 'economic 
ministries' as quickly as possible. We have not had time to establish the 
exact position. However, our brief investigations in Kenya indicate' that 
these 'slippages' may be present. It would be desirable if members of the 
Communications Council were informed immediately of the receipt of applica-
tions for Bilateral Agreements. (This was the situation under E.A.CVS.O. 
The Secretary of the Civil Aviation Board automatically informed members 
of the Communications Ministerial Council of such applications. The inter-
position of an East African Minister between the operating agency and the 
partner countries may recently have given rise to delays.) I n o r d e r to 
ensure that the Kenya Government does not remain in ignorance of applications 
for landing rights, it might be worthwhile setting up a committee to deal with •• 
landing rights (or adding landing rights to the concerns of the inter-
ministerial committee on freight rates) and to inform all foreign airlines 
of the wish of the committee to receive immediate notice of applications which 
they, or their Governments, have made to the Community. 
6. The Kenya economic ministries should be kept up to date with the status 
of landing rights applications and negotiations. Again, this might be a 
function for the freight rates committee. (A small point; we would suggest 
that working papers and memoranda referred to in the Minutes of the Communica-
tions' Council be included in the ministry files containing the Minutes.) 
7. In addition to new applications, the economic ministries should be aware 
of the services foreign airlines wish to provide but do not have rights for 
as a result of the compromises arising in previous negotiations. (For example, 
the chief economic return to the Alitalia freighter is from rights for cargo 
between Europe-Nairobi, Europe-Zambia and 'Nairobi and points north. They may 
not wish to jeopardize these rights by pushing also for rights between Nairobi 
and Zambia. But their willingness to provide this service can be made use of 
in the presence of temporary backlogs like the current one.) 
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The Criteria Followed in Granting Landing Rights in the Past: Temporary Rights 
8. Rights tend to be granted almost automatically for tourist charters. 
We do not know what policy is followed with respect to freight charters. 
Bilateral Air Services Agreements 
9. The most important explicitly stated objectives to be met from reaching 
bilateral agreements have been to protect the commercial position of EAA 
and to secure more services for Dar es Salaam and Entebbe. The tourist 
generation effects of allowing new services have also been explicitly mentioned. 
It is also clear that Governments have not been unaware of the relationships 
among granting landing rights, securing more investments in East Africa by 
the airlines, securing favourable treatment of aid applications, and 
reaching international political objectives,(such as cementing inter-African 
relations, etc-). 
10. At various times over the last few years, these general objectives have 
been viewed by the Community as implying various policies on landing rights. 
These have included: moratoria on the granting of new rights for foreign 
carriers to serve Nairobi (or what comes to the same thing, delaying tactics 
in conducting negotiations); arbitrary ceilings on the number of new services 
out of Nairobi versus Dar and Entebbe and/or out of East Africa as a whole; 
and limitations' on the numbers of services which will be granted to airlines 
from countries in which East African Airways is unwilling to take up the 
reciprocal rights negotiated. 
Future Criteria for Granting Landing Rights 
11. What has been conspicuously lacking, and what should be provided, is 
some attempt to measure the benefits and the costs from granting additional 
landing rights, and some attempt to provide a measure of the trade-offs 
among inconsistent objectives. We provide a brief analysis of the economics 
of landing rights, and of the information which should be sought in consider-
ing applications. It must be emphasized that we raise rather than answer 
questions in the following paragraphs. If we show the directions in which 




13. There is only one cost to East Africa of granting additional landing 
rights to a foreign airline. The new flight may carry some passengers, 
mail, and freight which would otherwise have travelled on EAA (or one of 
its pool partners). Since this diversion of traffic is the major reason 
usually put forward by EAA for opposing landing rights applications, EAA 
should be required: 
(a) to specify in £ its expected losses from allowing the new 
service, and 
(b) to give detailed assumptions (including details of the costing 
assumptions used) underlying the estimate. (We specify a 
little more fully in later paragraphs, the types of information 
required.) 
14. The losses to Kenya from any traffic diversion caused by new flights 
are only one third of the losses to East Africa, since Kenya is only a one 
third owner of EAA. 
Gains 
15. There are many types of gains to be secured from each new set of 
landing rights granted: 
(a) More tourists and businessmen will come to East Africa due to 
more convenient flights, greater space availability at peak seasons, and 
increased promotional efforts by the airlines (arising from increased 
competition among the carriers and new publicity by new carriers). 
Each additional tourist arriving on a scheduled flight from Europe 
brings a foreign exchange inflow of £60 - £100 or more (net of air fares) 
to Kenya and somewhat more to East Africa. These are the average figures 
for receipts to Kenya from holiday visitors, depending on nationality, 
and are taken from the Kenya Tourist Expenditure Survey 1967 (unpublished)= 
Diversion of one passenger from Europe to a new carrier or new service by 
an existing carrier from present services results in a fall of EAA!s 
revenues in the neighbourhood of £50. (EAA runs just under 20% of the 
services between Europe and East Africa. 20% of the return economy 
fare of £240 comes to £48.) This calculation assumes that all existing 
services suffer diversion in proportion to their capacity, and that 
diversion of first class passengers paying higher fares is counter-
balanced by diversion of lower paying passengers on Inclusive Tour Fares ; 
Thus, if the new flight results in as much.new traffic being-created as it 
diverts, Kenya's and East Africa's foreign exchange receipts will rise. 
Insofar as Kenya gets the lion's share of the spending by.new traffic, and 
suffers only one third of the loss of revenue to EAA, the breakeven foreign 
exchange receipt creation/diversion ratio of the new service will be around 
one third. Of course, it is not revenues received but net contribution to 
GNP which should be measured. This requires an opportunity costing of the 
losses to EAA and the gains in other revenues to Kenya. However, we would be 
surprised if, on a long run basis, this alternative calculation rendered a 
very different breakeven ratio." 
(b) Some airfreighted imports may arrive a little sooner saving costs 
to importers. 
(c) With more capacity available, there will be more space for exporters. 
(d) As well, there will be increased pressures on the airlines to 
reduce cargo rates to induce more imports and exports by air. The airlines 
will also have more incentive to discover new markets for Kenya exports in 
order to fill their capacity. A number of instances of supply creating its own-
demand in this sense were mentioned to us by persons in the trade. Examples 
included the finding of new export markets for Kenya horticultural and meat 
products. EAA officials have indicated that EAA is generally reluctant to 
take an expansionist policy of creating capacity in advance of demand. This 
reluctance — which must reflect airline policy — seems to be based on two 
grounds. First, as a small carrier, with limited access to 
finance, EAA must of necessity be more of a risk avoider than larger inter-
national airlines. Second, EAA lacks a sufficiently large and effective sales 
force to compete against foreign carriers. In addition, EAA faces the problem 
of being instructed to act as a commercial venture while also receiving 
instructions from Government (even worse, 3 Governments) that make this 
difficult. 
In the short run, of course, the breakeven ratio may be higher, since 
the loss from carrying fewer passengers consists of the revenue loss less 
only the out-of-pocket cost of handling more passengers on flights which 
would fly in any event. In the long run, fewer passengers would imply 
lower capital costs, administrative and selling costs and aircraft main-
tenance costs as well as lower out-of-pocket costs, and the lost profit would 
be commensurately smaller. 
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Changes iri'EAA's policy will probably require the East African Governments 
to re-examine their guidelines to East African Airways on matters ranging 
from financing,to staffing, to services which must be operated. 
(e) Every aircraft which lands in Nairobi ( or other airports) pays 
landing fees and ground handling fees, and under certain conditions night 
take-off fees and parking fees. These fees are not inconsiderable. For a single 
typical service between Europe and points beyond Nairobi with stop-overs at 
Nairobi going South (in daytime) and North (at night), these fees will amount 
to about £500 per week or £26,000 per year received by the Treasury. 
(f) Bilateral Air Services Agreements typically include an exchange 
of landing rights which can be taken up b}' EAA. 
(g) In many cases> EAA will be correct in its evaluation that it is 
not in a position to make profitable use of reciprocal landing rights. In 
these cases, it should not be told to introduce services. Nor, necessarily, 
should rights not be granted to foreign carriers if EAA does not wish to 
exercise reciprocal rights. These rights are worth something, and an effort 
should be made to ascertain whether East Africa - and Kenya - could derive some 
alternative benefit when EAA does not exercise them. As well, it will 
frequently be the case that gains in addition to reciprocal landing rights can 
be secured even when those rights are exercised. Examples of such gains 
include: 
(i) Equity/loan capital investment by foreign airlines in hotels, 
(ii) Promotion campaigns rop Eas t African tourism, 
(iii) Training for EAA staff. Indeed, it would be useful to have some 
staff in each major department of EAA with experience of different 
foreign airlines, including, especially, the commercial departments, 
(iv) Royalty payments to EAA for some of the passengers and/or freight 
handled by the new carriers. The same results can perhaps be 
obtained through setting up pooling agreements with the new carrier, 
or concluding general sales agreements^and servicing agreements. 
(We have noted some reluctance by EAA officials to exact more than reciprocal 
landing rights, or to approve of new services unless EAA is in a position to 
exercise those rights. This attitude appears to us to be unduly restrictive. 
Certainly those holding it were unable to defend it with concrete arguments 
which seemed compelling TO us,) 
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(h) As in the past, the granting of rights to carry traffic into 
and out of Nairobi can be tied to the requirement that increased services be 
provided to Dar and Entebbe. Between 1962 and 1967, the number of inter-
national airlines (excluding EAA) serving Entebbe rose from 4 to 12,Dar from 
3 to 12sand Nairobi from 13 to only 17. A majority of these increases to 
Entebbe and Dar can probably be accounted for by the requirement that services 
be initiated to those cities if Nairobi rights were also to be obtained. The 
losses occasioned to foreign carriers from having to serve Entebbe and/or 
Dar in order to secure Nairobi rights represent a hidden subsidy by Kenya to the 
other two countries, since the quid which Kenya could secure for the quo of 
Nairobi rights is reduced by those losses. The value of this subsidy could be 
considerable to the other countries. (If it came to £10,000 for each new 
airline serving the other two countries, it would amount to £170,000 per year, 
hardly a derisory sum. Careful study of the issue would probably.raise the 
estimate.) Insofar as the gains to the other East African countries -- in 
terms of the types of benefits outlined above — probably exceed the subsidy 
implicitly paid by Kenya, this type of subsidy may be an extremely efficient 
way of raising and redistributing the gains from belonging to the Community 
among its members. Attempts at calculation of the implicit subsidy, and the 
benefits received by Kenya's partners, would in our opinion be a useful 
exercise both for developing future landing rights policy criteria and for 
bargaining in other areas of interest covered by Community organisations. 
16. Some carriers have a particularly bad record of vetoing reductions 
cargo rates and passenger fares for East African routes proposed at the 
Conferences of the International Air Transport Association where those rates 
and fares are set. We believe that this factor should be taken into consider-
ation in granting landing rights to particular carriers. (Insofar as airlines 
flying here have Conference members not flying here veto proposed rates, care 
would have to be taken that this policy would not simply penalize those 
airlines which are open in their opposition and favour those adopting a 
hypocritical stance.) 
17. The past practice in negotiating bilateral agreements is to negotiate 
rights to pick up and land passengers, cargo and mail. This policy is unduly 
generous. Particularly if air capacity should appear to be a constraint 
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on air imports or exports, but not on passenger movements, and given the 
fact that mail is more profitable cargo than most others, we would propose 
that consideration be given to granting more restrictive bundles of rights 
as the situation appears to warrant. (We have already noted, in Appendix A, 
a couple of cases where there would be gains from granting rights to piek up 
freight only.) 
18. Almost every paragraph above indicates the importance of the Community 
aspect of the landing rights question. In almost every ease, there is some 
opposition of interest between Kenya and her partners. More specifically, in 
the field of air services, Kenya tends to be a goose which lays very golden 
eggs for her partners. This fact should not be forgotten when it comes to 
considering expanding the membership of the Community, and the detailed 
conditions under which new members will be admitted. With expansion of 
membership it is likely that Kenya will be called upon to lay even larger 
golden eggs. Distributed among more countries, the payoff to Kenya from them 
could fall. 
A Landing Rights Study 
19. This Appendix has raised more questions than it has answered. Conclusive 
answers must await a properly researched study of the issues raised. At a 
minimum, this study needs to outline the present situation and evaluate the 
following: 
(a) the legal and administrative situation with respect to the 
granting of landing rights; 
(b) the revenue sources of EAA, and a proper system for costing 
EAA flights; (This aspect would also be expected to throw more 
light on the profitability of EAA international versus domestic 
operations.) 
(c) the traffic creation versus traffic diversion effects of 
granting new flights; 
(d) the value to these countries of the traffic created by new 
flights as contrasted with"the likely size of the losses to 
EAA from new flights; 
(e) the extent to which EAA's competitiveness can be improved, 
including an evaluation of the degree to which Government 
policies on financing and staffing of EAA should be changed 
to render it more competitive with other international carriers. 
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A Summary of the Appendix 
20 We feel that East Africa - and especially Kenya - should adopt a 
generally expansionist attitude to the granting of landing rights. Expansion 
in capacity can be expected to result in pressures on the airlines to reduce 
air fares and cargo rates and to promote increased tourist and cargo business, 
including Kenya exports. Landing rights applications should be viewed in terms 
of the total gains which can be derived from them. Conventions hitherto 
followed on appropriate quids for Nairobi landing rights quos and on the 
bundles of rights negotiated should be re-examined to see whether more gains 
cannot be reaped. While such a re-examination might well begin with a study 
on the landing rights question, reaping the full gains possible may also 
require an improvement in the flow of information between Community Organisa-
tions and East African Governments, and within the Governments themselves. 
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Appendix C: The Valuation of Air Freight Charges for Customs Purposes 
Introduction 
1. We were initially requested to comment on the likely effects of a change 
in the basis of duty valuation on the amount of air freight capacity offered 
by the airlines. This issue is analyzed in this Appendix. We first examine 
the efficiency arguments for treating air freight charges differently than-sea 
freight charges for purposes of levying customs duty. Second, we outline what 
information we have been able to collect on the amount of imports by air and 
duty levied on them. Third, we comment on efficient strategies for switching 
to different bases of customs valuation for air freighted imports, should that 
be considered desirable in future. 
The Efficiency of cif Customs Valuation 
2. For analytical purposes, it is necessary to distinguish three classes of 
goods which come in by air: 
(a) Commodities which would not come by sea at all, and commodities 
which radically change their nature due to quick transport. 
Examples include perishable horticultural produce, high fashions 
(which change rapidly), newspapers, and some periodicals. 
(b) Commodities which normally come by sea, but come by air in 
emergencies. Examples include machine and auto parts which are 
not in stock but are needed if some larger operation (factory 
or car) is to function. Slightly different are imports of goods 
where the importer underestimated demand, or is concerned to 
promote sales by guaranteeing early delivery (e.g. Rank-Xerox 
charter). 
(c) Commodities which may normally be stocked by either air or sea 
depending on the cost factors. 
3. A commodity of type (a) can be treated like any other good for determin-
ing the appropriate duty to levy. Commodities of type (b) are in very inelastic 
demand and so are good sources of revenue, although it may be felt inappropriate 
to tax heavily people who are already having an unexpected problem (as in the 
case of emergency repairs). It is goods of type (c) with which we will deal 
in some detail. 
If an importer switches from regular stocking by sea to regular stocking 
by air, there are the following differences in costs: 
(a) freight charges per kilo imported are higher (5 to 10 times higher, 
depending on the commodity); 
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(b) packing costs may be lower, which will also lower the weight per 
item imported and so the freight bill. (However, factories are 
only willing to do special air packing when there is sufficient 
volume and cost saving per item); 
(c) lower inventories can be kept in Kenya, implying lower capital 
costs: 
(d) Insurance on air shipments is a smaller percentage of fob price 
than on sea shipments; 
(e.) obsolescence will be lower, reducing purchases necessary to supply 
a given demand, capital tied up in stocks, and freight charges since 
fewer items need to be imported. (Obsolescence can arise from 
deterioration in transit and storage or from the inability to sell 
items stocked due to model changes. For example, when motor spares 
are brought by sea, around 10-15% of the value of inventories 
obsolescences per year, while air importation might cut this in half); 
(f) (i) Smaller inventories will be in transit (this reduces interest 
costs);,' 
(ii) lower inventories held in Kenya will require less, space to be 
devoted to storage (and hence saving of rent and/or interest on 
warehouses) and perhaps fewer stock room staff; 
(iii) there may be somewhat less nuisance to the importer and somewhat 
better service to the customer (although the latter effect can be 
viewed as changing the commodity to something like goods men-
tioned in paragraph 2 (a)). 
5. With the exception of (f).all of the cost elements listed above are subject 
to the same ad valorem duty whether they come by air or by sea." Thus, apart 
" That duties are charged on obsolescence and interest on inventories held in 
Kenya can be clarified if we show algebraically the components of the cost 
incurred by a firm in supplying a final unit of demand. 
C = (l+b)(P+F) /Tl+t)(n/52)(1+i) + (s/52)i7 
C = cost of the item sold from stocks 
b = obsolete items as a proportion of items sold. Thus, if for every 
100 items sold, 5 become obsolete, b - 0.05. 
P = fob cost of the item 
F = freight and insurance on the item 
- t = ad valorem duty rate 
n = the number of weeks sales which are held as inventories in Kenya 
i = the rate of interest 
s = the number of weeks sales which are held as inventories in transit. 
/We could have complicated this formula by separating other costs such as pack-
ing, insurance, rent on warehouses in Kenya, etc. While this would have been 
necessary if we were costing a particular item, it is unnecessary to clarify 
the analytical point being made^/ 
All of the items in the above formula - except fii" will- be different for 
sea shipment versus air shipment. The firm which wishes to minimize "C" by 
choice of mode of transport will calculate this formula for both modes, of 
transport. The important point to note is that all elements of cost - excluding 
the cost of capital tied up in inventories in transit - are multiplied by i;t", 
the duty rate. That is, with one exception, all costs of stocking the item are 
subject to the same duty rate, and there is no discrimination between transport 
modes. 
On the other'hand, if duties were levied on the fob value of imports, the 
cost formula would become: 
C = (l+b)(P) /Cl+t)(n/52)(1+i) + (s/52)ij 
+ (1+b) (F) /(n/52) (1+i) + (S/52H7 
Cont'd /32 
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from .(f)., importers minimizing costs in their stocking for a given demand will 
make the-same decision between air and sea. freight as if there were no duties 
at all. On the assumption that Government and importers use the same rate of 
interest in their analyses, then, the argument that duties on cif values rather 
than fob ones.are inefficient is false (still excluding (f) ). The error arises 
from considering just shipping costs and ignoring the fact that the other 
relevant costs are also subject to duty at the same rate. The facts cited in 
paragraphs 14- and 15 of this Appendix, confirm the theoretical analysis given 
here. 
6 . Continuing to ignore (f), we can see that any lowering of duty on air 
freight not only leads to inefficiency (discrimination in favour of air freight) 
but also loses customs revenue for the Government. This is true even though 
the customs revenue on the freight component of the duty base goes up, since 
the other components (interest on inventories held, obsolescence, etc.) must 
go down if it is to be worthwhile switching from sea to air. We can think of 
such a duty lowering as being a subsidy on air freight to the full extent of 
the duty loss. The larger the number of commodities which switch due to a 
duty change the larger the subsidy. 
7. Let us consider (f) (i). At present, shipping times by sea are on the 
order of three to five months longer than by air (which takes one to two weeks 
on rush orders). If the goods are paid for when they leave the factory, the 
interest on the capital tied up in inventories in transit does not enter into 
the calculation of cif value for customs purposes.* If we assume a 10% interest 
rate, the cost saving from a switch to air from sea on an item comes to around 
Cont'd from page 31 
In this, case, not. only does the cost of capital tied up in inventories in 
transit escape duty, but also the freight charges, and interest on that part of 
inventory value held in Kenya which consists of freight and duty on freight cost. 
Thus, switching from cif to fob valuation of imports for duty purposes will 
lead firms to substitute untaxed (transport) costs for other taxed (mainly 
capital and obsolescence)' costs. If all of these costs, exclusive of duty, 
represent opportunity costs, the switch will lead to an inefficient allocation 
of resources - that is, to the use of more scarce resources to supply given 
final demands. 
* See footnote on page 31. (On the other hand, if the factory sells on 
credit, and includes the finance charges in the price of the goods, this item, 
(f) (i), will be included in cif value and hence will be dutiable.) 
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3% /T3/12 to 5/12) (10%27 of the cif value of the good. If, by a slight 
reduction in duty on air freight, an importer just on the margin of switching 
from sea to air freight does so, essentially the whole cost of the good will 
become subject to duty (if we ignore the interest on inventories in transit 
for one/two weeks). In these circumstances, the amount of duty paid by the mar-
ginal importer will rise, since even though he pays a lower rate of duty, it 
is levied on a larger cif value. In the case of the marginal importer, it is 
theoretically possible for the Government to capture the whole 3% in revenue. 
We have not attempted any detailed estimate of the size of (f) (ii), or (f)(iii). 
However, we are of the impression that any inefficiency of the present duty 
system on these grounds is probably minor .•.;:': 
8. There arc three further points which should be considered in this analysis. 
First, increased air imports may result in increased amounts of air cargo 
capacity to carry them and hence increased capacity for exports. This can be. 
thought of as an externality. If of important size, it may be worth while 
subsidising air freight (through a duty reduction) to secure it. Since, as 
pointed out in Appendix A, there does not appear to us to be a shortage of 
air freight capacity, we would not recommend such a subsidy at present. However, 
it is a valid argument for a subsidy should capacity shortages develop in 
future. We do some sample calculations later (paras 22-28) on the cost of such 
a subsidy. 
9. Second, changes in the duty structure, together with resulting changes 
in the demand for air freight space, will induce the airlines to attempt to 
change freight rates. In particular, reductions in duty rates will lead the 
airlines to seek higher freight rates. Airlines will not, in general, wish to 
raise rates by the same amount as the fall in duty. It will be worthwhile 
having the price facing importers (including duty on air freight) fall some-
what, so that more business can be done at a higher price.. The evidence we 
have collected (para 16) is consistent with the theoretical conclusien that 
duty rates and air freight rates are inversely correlated (although other 
factors, also noted there, may also be at work). The main point we would 
emphasize is that if a duty ehange is contemplated, every attempt be made, 
- 34 - . v 
through negotiations with the airlines, simultaneously to secure lower cargo 
rates on the items affected (or at least no rises in. them).* 
* The argument in the text can be stated algebraically. Assume that the 
profit function of the airlines is represented by 
(1) T = p.Q /Tl+t)£7 - C {Q/Tl+t)£7} 
where T equals the profits of the airlines, p is the commodity freight rate, 
Q/Ti+t)g7 is the quantity of the commodity moving by air and is assumed to depend 
upon the price which transporters must pay for transport (which consists of 
the freight rate + the duty on the freight rate)., and C is the cost of air 
freighting goods to the airlines, which is assumed to depend upon the quantity 
of freight carried. Since the airlines have a cartel, they are in a position 
to act monopolistically. Even if they were not in a cartel, most airlines 
have a large enough share of the market that the demands facing them are down-
ward sloping: that this, that they would be able to affect the amount of freight 
they secured by altering the freight rates charged. 
Differentiating (1) with respect to p yields the first order condition for a 
profit maximum: 
(2) = p. Q'. (1+t) + Q - C' . Q» , (1+t) = 0 dp 
The condition for this to be a maxim™ is that the second derivative of T with 
respect to p be less than 0: 
2 
(3) = p.Q".(1+t)2 + 2Q'.(1+t) - (1+t)2 /~C" .Q'2 + C' . (T/ < 0 
' dp 
Now, to find what happens to p when we change t, we take the differential of 
clT (2), set drr—, and dQ equal to zero, and form: 
rm - - P-Q' - c' -Q' dt ~ 2 2 Q X d T/dp 
(3) tells us that the denominator of this expression is negative. 
(2) tells us that the numerator must be negative. Since,, the whole expression 
is preceded by a minus, (4) is negative. That is, as'tariff rates, t, are 
raised, air freight charges will fall, and vice versa. 
This conclusion is subject to one qualification. The conditions 
for a profit maximum given above only ensure a local maximum. If there 
is more than one profit maximizing point„ the above procedure does not 
indicate which is the largest•maximum. The. argument of the above algebra 
and the qualification can be shown diagrammatically. (Note that in the 
diagram, we are, unlike in the algebra, using quantity rather than price 
as the control variable.) 
B3f represents the demand for air freight, inclusive of duty. 
With a 35% duty rate, the demand facing the airlines will be D D J . If . 
the marginal cost of handling freight is MC» the airlines willanaximize 
their- profits by setting a freight rate of p , and handling Q v of cargo. 
(The price paid by the shippers will of course be higher by tBe amount 
of the duty} and they will pay p^ (Itt) per kilo shipped.) 
How let us assume that no duty is charged on airfreight, all 
other duty rates remaining the same.' The demand facing the airlines will 
now be DD!. In this new situation, there are two local profit maximizing 
points. The first is at Q_* where the airlines charge p1 for freight 
(which is higher than p. This is the case outlined above. The other is 
at Q^, with the corresponding freight rate of p„'. This is lower- than the 
initial freight rate p . ~ 
Clearly» we will only secure the latter result if there is a sharp 
bend in the demand curve. That is, we may have a lowering of freight 
rates as a result of a duty change if there is some 'thresbhold * freight-
rate below which very.large quantities of freight would switch from sea 
to air. Is such a Hhreshhold' likely? It is obvious that for any 
particular commodity there will be a threshhold freight rate b&low which 
it will switch to air. However, most 'commodities' defined for customs 
(or Special Commodity Rate) purposes (such as 'motor- spares1) are far 
from homogeneous in terms of fob value per kilo of particular, consign-
ments » and presumably in terms of switching rates. In general,'then we 
would not expect to find large switches at particular threshhold rates. 
(In para. 22-28, where we calculate the implications of reducing the 
• duty on the air freight charge on motor -spares, we assume that each 
shilling reduction in air freight cost will induce equal amounts .of spares 
to switch.) 
10. Third, some air freight imports come by East African Airways.-* When an 
import switches from sea to air by E M there is an increase in EAA's profits. 
For this reason, it might be possible to justify subsidizing air freight 
relative to sea freight. E.A.A. carries about 20% of imports from Europe. 
Short run marginal costs on this route are probably on the order of shs. 1.50 
while the average charge on air freight imports Europe-Kenya is approximately 
shs 12.20.** Thus, for ''average" good that switches (to use existing air 
capacity), 18% of the freight bill /20% X (12.2 - 1.5)/12.2/ represents an 
increase in profitability to EAA. Ideally, we would like E.A.A. inside the 
tariff wall (but perhaps subject to excise taxation) and all other airlines 
outside it. Since this is not possible, there is some basis for a decrease in 
duty on airfreight. It should be remembered;; however, that only one third of 
the EAA gains will accrue to Kenya and that all foreign carriers will be 
subsidized to the same extent as EAA. As well, in the long run, when the full 
marginal costs of adding to airline capacity must be covered, the percentage 
of the freight bill on switching import- which represents an increase in the 
profitability of EAA will be much c.:»aller. 
* E.A.A. has about 20% of the .reight from Europe, whereas a much smaller 
proportion of sea imports co..;e on Ea^t African ships. 
** This air freight rate was calculated from our sample of airwaybills at 
Embakasi as follows: 
CALCULATION OF AVERAGE AIR FREIGHT RATE EUROPE-NAIROBI 
~~le 
Total 
Tonnes; in Assumed 
Sample tonnes 
('000 kg) ('000 kg) 
Dutiable Freight (1) 
from Europe in 
week 1 11.74 




week 1 5.74 




.. - / 













(12,20) % V 









a/ The tonnages of non-dutiable freight were adjusted on the basis that the 
second week's sample included 0.4572 of total kilos of non-dutiable goods 
passing through customs at Embakasi. 
b/ Calculated from dividing total of Col. (2) into total of Col (4) 
Source: See Table VII 
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11• To Summarise: that imports by air are valued for duty purposes on a cif 
basis results in no significant inefficiency of treatment of air versus sea 
traffic. Changing the basis of duty valuation on air "imports is one legitimate 
way of subsidising air freight should that be considered desirabl© for purposes 
of increasing air freight usage. At present, there appears to be sufficient 
air freight capacity to handle demands to Europe — a n d substantial-increases 
in capacity can be made without any changes in the duty rate (see appendix A K 
Since the present situation may not persist, however, it is necessary to 
discuss the nature of the changes in duty which might be made in future to 
increase air freight capacity. Before going on to this, we first set out the 
information we have been able to collect on air freight imports» dirty on them, 
and the evidence supporting the analytical conclusions of this section. 
The Current Situation 
12. Customs revenue for Kenya collected at the airport increased from £357,197 
in 1967 to £521,686 in 1968. (Monthly figures are given in Table VI.) This 
figure represents collections at the airport and so includes a small figure 
for revenue collected on goods brought with passengers. It excludes the revenue 
on goods that are imported by air but are taken to bonded warehouses in Nairobi 
before paying customs duty. Customs officials feel that the exclusion is under 
5% of the total. The estimate also excludes duty paid on air-freighted 
imports by parcel post. (The total duty on parcel post for Nairobi alone came 
to £758,713 in 1968 but we do not know how this breaks down between air and sea 
shipments). 
13. To obtain some idea of the nature of this revenue, we took a full sample 
of air waybills for dutiable consignments arriving at the Nairobi airport 
between 3rd January, 1968 and 10th January, 1968 (Excluding 5th January, 1968) 
and between 16 and 23 January 1968 excluding 19th January). In addition, we 
took an approximately one in ten sample of air waybills for non-dutiable 
consignments arriving during the first period and one in two in the second. 
(Note that non-dutiable items are occasionally included in the same consignments 
as dutiable ones. These are included with the latter in our figures. It should 
also be noted that the representativeness of the sample may be affected by the 
season — Christmas/New Year traffic — and by the current uncertainty over the 
issue of trade licenses.) The basic data are summarised in Tables VII, VIII 
and IX. 
TABLE VI 
IMPORT DUTIES COLLECTED AT NAIROBI AIRPORT, 















































SOURCE: E.A. Customs and Excise, Air Cargo Shed, Embakasi. 
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TABLE VII DUTY COLLECTED, AIRFREIGHT CHARGES PAID, AND KILOS OF 
FREIGHT PASSING THROUGH CUSTOMS AT EMBAKASI. 
(a) Sample Week 1 (3-10 January, excluding 6 Jan., 1968) 
Duty Status Dutiable. Freight Non-Dutiable Freight^ ./ 
Origin of freight Europe Other Total Europe Other Total 
1. CIF Value(shs '000) 545 307 852 366 90 455 
2. Freight Charge (") 
3. Total Duty (") 
124 37 161 
143 84 228 . 
36 12 ' 47— 
11.74 5.50 17.24 
66 9 75 
4. Duty on Freight (") 
5. Tonnes ('000 kg) 5.74 2.16 7.89 
(b) Sample Week 2 (16-23 January, excluding 19 January) 
Duty Status Dutiable Freight Non-Dutiable Freight 
Origin of freight Europe Other Total Europe Other Totalg./ 
1. CIF Value (shs '000) 
2. Freight Charge (") 
3. Total Duty (") 
4. Duty on Freight (") 













587 257 854 
98 23 122 
6.19 1.86 8.05 
Note: Some totals do not add up due to rounding 
a/ These figures are for a very small sample of non-dutiable freight passing 
through Embakasi in the first week. For the second, they represent 45.72% 
of non-dutiable freight, by weight. 
b/ Estimated on the basis of duty rate times freight charge. Since many con-
signments included items with different duty rates, some estimation was 
required. 
c/ One large shipment from the U.S.A. with many duty free components (tractor 
spares) was worth just over \ the cif value of this column. It came to 
shs. 709 per kilo!) 
Source: Air Waybills and Customs Mainfests, East African Customs and 
Excise Department, Air Cargo Shed, Embakasi. 
TABLE VIII FREIGHT AND DUTY RATIOS FOR DUTIABLE AND N0N-DUTIABLE AIR IMPORTS 
PASSING THROUGH CUSTOMS AT EMBAKASI. 
(a) Sample Week 1 
Duty Status Dutiable Non-Dutiable 
Origin of Imports Europe Other Total Europe Other Total 
, Air Freight Charge 
CIF Value .227 .119 .188 .180 .102 .165 
0 Duty on Freight 
Total Duty - .248 .138 .208 - - -
3. CIF(sh)/Kilo 46.41 55.90 49.44 63.78 41.52 57.69 
4. Freight Chg(sh)/kg 10.55 6.67 9.31 11.50 4.22 9.51 
( b) Sample Week 2 
Duty Status Dutiable Non--Dutiable 
Origin of Imports Europe Other Total Europe Other Total 
1. Air Freight Charge CIF Value .245 .068 .163 .167 .091 ,142 
2. Duty on Freight Total Duty .243 .138 .219 - - -
Q CIF Value (sh) 
Kilos 43.73 157.00 65.72 94.91 137.87 106.09 
4. Freight Chg.(sh) 
Kilos 
10.71 10.74 10.71 15.90 12.52 15.12 
Source: Table VII 
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TABLE IX Composition of Airfreight (percentage by weight) in Sample 
Weeks Passing Through Customs at Embakasi. 
• Dutiable - Hon-Dutiable 
1st week 2nd week 1st week5'5 2nd week* 
' .-- .-;: • • . •• % % a, o 
Motor Spares 30 48 -
0. Spares & Parts 17 17 19 
Food 7 7 
Air craft spares 11 
Airline goods (incl. 
diaries, calendars, bags 19 2 
etc. 
A dvertising materials 
(incl. sales manuals) 8 2 4 
'Clothing & Cloth- .4. 3 
19 Machinery & Equipment 4 1 
Films for Exhibition and 
some promotional materials 2 2 
Cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, 
and medicines 1 3 2 
Photo Film 1 1 
Cameras & accessories 1 1 
Newspapers & periodicals - - 22 
Chicks,, seeds, livestock. 
semen 3 
Books 1 
Misc. 6 . 13 20 
Total 100 100 • 101 
No. kilos in Sample: 17.2 18.1 7.9 8.1 
* First week's sample was too small to warrant reporting here.. (So, perhaps, 
was the second week's.) However, the major items appearing in the list, 
as in the second week, were aircraft spares, newspapers and various types 
of equipment. 
Note: It should be remembered that substantial quantities of some of these 
commodities are imported via air parcel post, which is cleared through 
customs at Post Offices. At Nairobi Post Office alone, duty on Parcel 
Post imports .came .to £758,000 in 1968 (compared with £522,000 collected 
at Embakasi). 
Source: Airwaybills and Customs Manifests-, East African Customs and Excise 
Department, Air Cargo Shed, Embakasi. 
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14. We can use the information collected to test the analytical conclusion 
5 
of para/_ that cif customs valuation does not discriminate against air freight. 
If this conclusion is true, we would expect to find that freight charges as 
a proportion of cif value.would be no lower for dutiable than for duty-free 
commodities. (If cif valuation were discriminatory, we would expect to find 
that freight would be a smaller proportion of cif value for duitable than non-
dutiable commodities.) We found that freight charges as a percentage of cif 
value for dutiable commodities came to 18.8% and 16.3% in our two sample weeks. 
For non-dutiable commodities, this percentage was 16.5% and 14.5% in the two 
weeks. Thus, the hypothesis of para 5 is supported by the evidence. 
15. Additional evidence to the same effect can be secured by comparing, within 
dutiable commodities, the percentage of cif value comprising freight charges 
for commodities subject to different duty rates. If the non-discriminatory 
hypothesis is correct, we would expect to find that there is no difference in 
this percentage for high duty and low duty commodities. (If the discriminatory 
hypothesis is correct, we would expect to find that freight charges are a lower 
percentage of cif value for high duty commodities than low duty ones.) The 
means we used to perform this test was to compare the ratio of duty on freight 
to total duty paid with the ratio of freight charges to the cif value of 
imports. If there is no discrimination, the two ratios should be the same. 
If there is discrimination against air freight, the first ratio should be 
smaller than the second. For the two sample weeks, duty on air freight as a 
percentage of total duty came to 20.8% and 21.9%, while as we saw in the last 
paragraphthe air freight charge as a percentage of cif value on dutiable 
commodities came to.18.8% and 16.3%. Thus, the evidence does not support the 
discriminatory hypothesis.* 
* .The discriminat ry hypothesis for a two good case can be written as follows: 
(1) If tx > t2 then F1/CIF1 < F2/CIF2 or if t < then F /CIF1 > F2/CIF2 r- _ — 
where F. is the freight charge on good i, CIF. is the cif value of good i, 
and t^ Is the ad valorem duty rate on good i. 
The test employed in the text stated that if 
(2) V l + V 2 < F1 + F2. 
tJLCIF1+t2CIF2 CIF1+CIF2 
is true, then the discriminatory hypothesis must hold. That (2) gives the same 
result as (1) can be verified by cross multiplying (2), rearranging terms, and 
dividing by t and CIF .CIF to secure i. 1 A 
( 3 ) /I - — 7 < o — t — — CIF CIF — 
Cont:d on page 42 
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15. The theory set out in para 9 implied that we would expect to find higher 
air freight charges for non-dutiable than dutiable commodities. This was 
supported by the evidence on air freight charges which we were able to collect 
(Table VIII). In particular, the average freight rate for dutiable commodities 
came to shs 9.31 and 10.71 per kilo in the two sample weeks. For non-dutiable 
commoditiesa it came to shs 9.51 and 16.12 per kilo.* 
17. The tests employed in the three preceding paragraphs are very rough. 
However, when they are combined with our theoretical analysis, our assessment 
of the landing rights situation, and the costs of changing duty rates (discussed 
in paras. 24~30), they are sufficient to lead us not to recommend any duty 
changes at present. Should such a change be seriously considered in future, 
we would strongly recommend that a more detailed analysis be carried out using 
a sample of individual consignments large enough to permit disaggregation of 
the influence of more geographical areas and the commodity composition of 
imports on the ratios shown, as well as to check the validity of the empirical 
evidence given here. 
18. We can also use the information gathered to estimate some total magnitudes 
for 1968. Using the ratios found for duty on freight to total duty paid, it 
is likely that £109,000 to £114,000 of the duties collected at the airport 
were paid on air freight charges. The ratios of duty to cif value, together 
with the figure for duties collected at the airport, result in estimates of 
dutiable imports of £1,950,000 and £2,590,000 in 1968. If we assume that 
Cont'd from page 4l 
The data cited in the text contradicted (2) and hence the discriminatory 
hypothesis. By the same token, it confirmed the non-discriminatory hypothesis. 
Of course, it may be that goods of type (a) and (b) (See para. 2 of this 
Appendix) tend to have higher tariff rates than goods of type (c) which our 
analysis deals with, and that the presence of these types of goods biases our 
empirical result. However, the preponderance of motor and other spares indicated 
in Table IX among dutiable air imports, which we know from interviews to be 
regularly stocked by air, indicates that this is not the full explanation. 
s's These results may be biassed by the fact that volume as well as weight 
is a relevant dimension of air freight, and that there may be systematic 
differences between the volume/weight ratios of dutiable and non-dutiable freight. 
As well, the result may have been a result of systematically different points 
of origin for dutiable versus non-dutiable freight. Air freight charges were 
higher on non-dutiable commodities than dutiable ones coming from Europe in 
both sample weeks, but higher in one, and lower in the other in the case of 
imports from other areas. 'Other' areas were a very mixed bag, including 
shipments from America to Zambia. 
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these two weeks were typical of the period, we can multiply the cif value 
of dutiable imports for those two weeks (See table VII) by 26, to secure an 
estimate of.£2,650,000. In the case of non-dutiable imports, we do not know 
what percentage our sample was of imports in the first week.' In the second 
week, our sample comprised 45.72% of non-dutiable imports by weight. Dividing 
the CIF value of our sample in that week by this percentage and multiplying 
by 52 yields an estimate of non-dutiable imports via Nairobi for 1968 of 
£4,900,000. (We would warn that this estimate is arrived at on the basis of 
very slender information indeed). If the above estimates are correct, the cif 
from outside East Africa 
value of air freight/passing through customs at Nairobi airport came to around 
£7.5 million in 1968. 
19. Paragraph 11 indicated that we do not recommend any tariff change at 
present, but that such a change may be desirable in future. It is therefore 
worthwhile commenting upon the type of change which should be considered if a 
change is desired. 
20. If Government wishes to increase air freight capacity by a certain amount 
by altering duty rates on air freight, we recommend that the increase be sought 
at the minimum loss of customs revenues. The basic rationale for this recommend-
ation is that duty loss minimizing changes will involve the least social Cost." 
In view of the substantial duties collected on presently air freighted imports, 
the 
and the fact that some of these goods come under/classifications (a) and (b) 
of paragraph 2, this criterion precludes consideration of any schemes for treat-
ing all air freighted imports alike. (If such a course is considered, however, 
we would suggest that the experience of Ethiopia which recently moved from cif 
to rating air freight at 1/3 for customs purposes, be investigated. It may 
"* Importers will only switch from sea to air if air becomes cheaper - to the 
importer - than sea. Barring a rise in freight rates (viz. paras. 9 and 16), 
the only cost element to fall as a result of a duty change will be duty. If 
importers switch, the other costs of importation must rise. Hence, switching 
importers must incur , higher real or social (non-duty) costs after than before 
the rise. Therefore, the smaller the fall in duty revenues to secure a given 
increase in air freight capacity, the smaller will be the rise in social costs 
of supplying the demand for imported commodities. It should be noted that 
this argument does not refer to the desirability of leaving total tax. receipts 
unchanged. If the Government's revenues were the only consideration, any 
reduction in duties arising from reducing the duty on air freight charges could 
be made up by raising all duty rates proportionally to make good the deficiency. 
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also be worthwhile checking on countries which levy customs duties fol? (see 
Table X) ). Instead, Government- should seek commodities of which little 
presently comes by air and of which substantial quantities would switch from 
sea to air with a small duty reduction. 
21. Two commodities were suggested to us as filling this description and as 
being of quantitative significance. These are motor spares and pharmaceuticals 
and cosmetics. (Film products had to be ruled out because it is the unalterabf j 
policy of the largest importer's suppliers to bill the importer at prices fixed 
at cif Mombasa, to which air freight charges are added if particular shipments 
come by air!) The commodity composition of air imports in our sample is shown 
in Table IX. See also Table XI for the composition of Kenya's imports from 
the U.K., valued fob in £ Sterling. 
22. From industry sources we estimated that duty on the air freight charges 
on air imported motor spares in 1968 came to £ 28,000 or to 25 or 26% of the 
total duty on air freight charges estimated in para 18 above. The percentage 
of total duty comprising duty collected on auto spares came to 22.7% and 33.9% 
in the two sample weeks. These percentages imply duties paid on auto spares 
coming in by air in 1968 of £ 118,000 and £177,000, and duties paid on the air 
freight charges of auto spares of £25,000 and £ 48,000. 
23. Industry sources indicated that little in the way of dutiable pharmaceuticals 
or cosmetics are coming in by air. In the first week's sample, duty on the air 
freight of these items amounted to shs 22 out of a total of shs 47,282, and in 
the second, to shs 1,927 out of shs 52,275. 
* It should be noted that for some of these countries, the argument raised in 
para 10 for subsidizing air freight may have more relevance than it does for 
Kenya. In particular, it is likely that a much higher proportion of airfreight 
to the United States is carried by national carriers than 5s true for Kenya. 
(We hope to investigate the figures later.) The U.S.A. is also a major 
exporter of aircraft - but a minor producer of ships - and therefore has more 
interest in subsidizing air transport than Kenya which has no standing in 
either field. Finally, of course, the United States is concerned to have a 
large air industry for military reasons. 
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*1 fob with "non-discriminatory" variations 
* fob ** price paid or current domestic value *** fair market value 
**** ex-factory price ***** Specific ****** invoice price 
aJ We could3 following the analysis of this report, cite this as a list of 
Countries which discriminate in favour of air-freight. We considered it less 
confusing to use the terminology of the source. 




KENYA IMPORTS FROM THE U.K. BY AIR AND BY SEA, 1967 
(fob value in £ Sterling) 
T O T A T 171 CODE(DIV)NO. COMMODITY DESCRIPTION AIR TRADE iOOO's SEA TRADE £000's 
00 Live animals, seed,Zoo animals, 
dogs and cats 24.6 9.2 33.8 
01 Meat & Meat preparations 0.2 47.2 47.4 
02 Dairy products 8 Eggs 0.3 43.6 43.9 
03 Fish S Fish preparations 0.8 31.9 32.7 
04 Cereals and Preparations 0.02 235.08 235.1 
05 Fruit & Vegetables 0.1 61.6 61.7 
06 Sugar and Preparations, honey 0.9 197.8 198.7 
07 Coffee, Tea, Cocoa, Spices 0.1 311.2 311.3 
08 Feeding stuff for animals 1.2 34.3 35.5 
09 Misc. food preparations 0.8 175.5. 176.3 
11 Beverages 3.9 285.1 289.0 
12 Tobacco and manufactures- 9.7 69.3 79.0 
21 Hides' and Skins, undressed 2.9 . - 0 2.9 
23 Crude rubber and synthetic .0.04 16.1.. . 16.14 
26 Textile fibres not mfgd. into. gowns 
etc. 0.03 207.17 207.2 
27 Crude fertilizers and minerals 0.07 66-. 03 •--- 66.1 
29 Crude Animal 8 Vegetable materials "3.3 - -•• 8.1 11.4 
32 Mineral fuels 8.3' 8.3 
33 Petroleum & products" • 0.8 -592.0 - •• - 592.8 
51 Chemical elements and""compounds 339.3 340.7 
53 Dyeing, tanning & colouring materials 2.9 434-.1 437.0 
54: .Medicinal & pharmaceutical products 93.a 1000.1 1094,0 
55 Essential Oils 8 Perfume materials 
toilet preparations 7.7 370.4 - - 378.1 
56 Fertilizers, manufactured 0.03 34.77 34.8 
57 Explosives 8 pyrotechnic products 3.7 153.6 ..-- 157.3 
58 Plastic materials, resins 3.2. 394.4 397.6 
59 Chemical materials N.E.S. 4.0 733.4 737.4 
61 Leather, Leather mfgsdressed - .' — - — -
fur skins 6.2 18.8 25.0 
62.Rubber mfgs. N.E.S. 29.3 1.044.7 1074.0 
63 Wood 8 Cork "mfgs. " 1 . 1 44.2' 45.3 
64 Paper 8 paper mfgs-. 19.2 " 828.6 . 847.8 
65 Textile yarn, fabrics 8 related prds.27.2 " 1079.6 1106.8 
66 Non-metalic mineral rofgs. N.E.S. 9.1 447.4 456.5 
67 Iron 8 Steel 0.8 • 1464.0 • 1464.8 
68 Non-ferrous metals 5.0 452.4 457.4 
69 Manufactures of metal 39.9 1853.7 1903.6 
71 Machinery other than electric 1653.8 6955.0 8608.8 
72 Electrical machinery, apparatus 
and appliances 344.6 2946.2 3290.8 
73 Transport equipment 1369.4 15460.0 16829.4 
81 Sanitary, plumbing, heating and 
lighting fittings 2.0 ; - " 221.3 223.3 
82 Furniture 11.5 129.1 140.6 
83 Travel goods, handbags etc. 6.3 40.9 47.2 
84 Clothinga knitted or crocheted 46.6 212.9 . 259.5 
85 Footwear 3.9 ' 99.7 103.6 
86 Professional, Scientific 8 
Controlling instruments 232.5 571.1 803.6 
89 Misc. mfgd. articles, N.E.S. 418.8 1101.6 . 1520.4 
90 Misc. Postal parcels, dogs, cats, 
etc. 524.9 1557.9 2082.8 
TOTAL ' • ..- 4918.7 " 42398.7 47320.3 
SOURCE: Provided by BOAC Air Cargo Manager, East Africa. 
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A Sample Calculation of a Duty Switch: Auto Spares 
24. At presents air imported motor spares from Europe to Nairobi come at 
Special Commodity (Freight) Rates of shs 7.14 to shs 8.56 per kilo for con-
signments of a minimum size, of 500 or 1,000 kilos depending upon the point of 
departure. The average freight charge for auto spares from Europe in our first 
week's sample was shs 7.77 per kilo, and in the second week's sample,- shs 7.22 
per kilo. In what follows, we assume a rate of shs 7.50 per kilo. With the 
addition of approximately 35% duty,5'5 the cif freight cost comes to shs 10.12 
per kilo. 
25. It has been suggested to us by persons in the trade that if the total 
freight cost (freight rate + duty) of air freighting auto spares could be 
reduced to shs 6.00 per kilo, the amount of auto spares imported by air would 
rise from 1968's approximate figure of 200,000 kilos to around 960,000 kilos 
(80,000 kilos per month). Let us assume that this is correct. If Government 
were to charge duty on only one third of the freight bill for imports of 
motor spares, the airlines would have to reduce the freight rate to shs. 5.37 
to reach the shs 6.00 per kilo target. While it is optimistic to think the 
airlines would cut the rate, we assume for the moment that they will. On 
present (1968) imports of motor spares, the customs loss due to this change 
would be £19,900 /200,000 kilos times (2.62-0.63)_7. What would the duty loss 
be on the 760,000 kilos which switched from sea to air? On those commodities 
which are even now on the margin of switching, the duty loss will come to the 
full shs 1.99 (2.63-0.63) per kilo since they would pay essentially the same 
duty if they came by air today as they now are when they are coming by sea.*5'5 
* This includes a small uplift on the published rate of 33% to take care 
of dealer discounts. While the average duty rate found., for our samples was 
around 33%, the sample shipments included some tractor spares mixed in with 
the motor spares. Since tractor spares do not pay duty, their presence reduced 
the average. 
** We ignore the fact that the duty base would rise slightly for the reasons 
pointed out in para 7. Inclusion of this factor would reduce the loss 
figures slightly. 
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On those commodities which are just on the margin of switching after the lower 
freight and duty rates are in force, the customs duty loss would come to shs 
0.93 per kilo*. If we assume that for equal reductions in landed cost equal 
amounts of motor spares will switch, the average customs duty loss per kilo 
switching will be (shs 1.99 + shs 0.93)/2 or shs 1.46 per kilo. This implies 
a duty loss on switching traffic of £ 55,480 (760,000 kilos times shs 1.46 
kilo). Adding the duty loss from the existing traffic, we secure a total duty 
loss of £ 75,380. This comes to a loss of duty of shs 1.99 per kilo switching. 
This loss to Government is counterbalanced by a reduction of freight rates to 
current importers of shs 2.13 per kilo (shs 7.50 - 5.37) and an average reduc-
tion in cost on this account to switching importers of one half this, or shs 
1.07 (calculated on the same assumption about the sensitivity of switching to 
import costs as used above to calculate the duty loss). In total, the savings 
to importers (and the country) on account of the freight rate change comes to 
£61,770.** The saving to importers on account of the duty loss comes to £ 75,380, 
and the total saving due to the change in duty and freight rate to £137 ,,150 or 
to shs 2.86 per kilo. This saving will accrue as increased profits to stockists 
of motor spares, and lower prices to users of motor spares. 
26. Let us now ask about what would happen if the airlines refused to reduce 
their freight rates, but if the Government nevertheless charged duty on only 
1/3 of the air freight component of auto spares. On the basis of our above 
assumption about the numbers of kilos which would switch as the combined price 
of air freight + duty on air freight fell, this change would imply a switch of 
approximately 320,000 kilos.*** The duty loss to the Government would come to 
* If an importer is just on the margin of switching when the air freight + duty 
on it is shs 6.00, this means that he can switch and pay no more for air import-
ation than he did by sea importation. At 35% duty, the duty component of shs 
6.00 landed cost is 6.00/1.35 = 4.44 and the duty element is 6.00-4.44 or 1.56. 
However, when the commodity comes by air, he pays only 11.67% duty on the air 
freight, or shs 0.63. Thus, by switching, he pays shs 1.56 - 0.63 = shs 0.93 
per kilo less in duty. 
** This comes to shs 1.63 per kilo switching. It should be noted that 20% 
of this reduction will represent a revenue loss to E.A.A. 
*** In this Ca.se, the air freight rate remains at shs 7.50. One third of the 
regular duty on this comes to 0.1167X7.50 = 0.88. The previous duty was shs 
2.62 per kilo. The duty saving (and the cost reduction to importers) comes 
to shs 2.62 - 0.88 = 1.74. In the previous case, a cost reduction of shs 4.12 
(shs 10.12 - shs 6.00) was assumed on the basis of information of the trade to 
lead to a switch of 760,000 kilos. If we assume that equal quantities will 
switch for each shilling reduction in cost, which assumption we used above in 
calculating costs and savings, the switch in this case will come to 
760,000 X 1.74/4.12 = 320,971. 
- 49 -
£ 17,900 on existing freight, and to £ 16,580 on switching freight, for a 
total duty loss of £ 34,480.* This comes to a duty loss of shs 2.15 per kilo 
switching. 
27. 100% loads of auto spares south at shs 5.37 per kilo and horticultural 
produce North at shs 3.00 per kilo would be marginally profitable for a new 
freighter (see Appendix A: paragraph 22). They would definitely be profitable 
at shs 7.50 South and.shs 3.00 North if these load-factors could be secured. 
28. If we assume that we could secure 100% loads in both directions, and if 
we assume that new freight capacity would appear to carry them, would making 
the duty changes be worthwhile? Kenya's horticultural exports earn shs 6-7 
per kilo valued fob, say shs 6.50. In the first case, where the airlines 
reduce freight rates, the Government would lose shs 1.99 per kilo of new 
aircraft capacity (assumed equal to switching imports of auto spares). In 
essence, it would be spending shs 1.99 to secure increased foreign exchange 
earnings of shs 6.50. This comes to a subsidy of almost 31%. (On the other 
hand, importers make a saving due to lower freight rates of shs 1.63 per kilo 
switching. The net subsidy comes to shs 1.99 - 1.63 = shs 0.33 per kilo or 
around 5% of new export earnings.) 
28. In the case where the airlines do not reduce their freight rates, the 
whole shs 2.15 duty loss per kilogram represents a subsidy to horticultural 
exports. This comes to a subsidy of 33%. 
30. The above figures are minimum estimates of the subsidy. We would expect 
horticultural exports to be more seasonal than imports of auto spares. This 
means that we would have to induce more than one kilo of auto spares to move 
by air per kilo of induced horticultural exports. If, as is likely, the ratio 
were as high as 2, we should double the numbers given above for rates of subsidy 
* Duty saving by the marginal switcher at the initial duty rate comes to 
shs 1.74.per kilo. Duty saving to the switcher who is marginal at the new duty 
rate comes to shs 1.30. If it is just worth his while to import by air when 
the total cost of air importation comes to shs 8.38 per kilo (freight rate of 
shs 7.50 + duty at .1167% or shs 0.88), then the duty he is paying if he brings 
his goods by sea will be shs 8.38 - 9.38/1.35 or 2.18. Now, however, even 
though his costs are the same, the duty paid on this element of cost is only 
shs 0.88 per kilo, and so he pays shs 2.18-0.88 = shs 1.30 less duty per kilo. 
Given our assumption that we get the same kilos switching per shilling reduction 
in landed cost, the average duty loss will be (1.30 + 1.74)/2 = 1.02, and the 
total duty loss on switching traffic will be 320,000X1.02= shs 321,600. 
Finally, it should be noted that since importers substitute air freight costs 
for duty if they are to switch, this duty loss also represents an increase in 
foreign exchange cost (ignoring the freight which would be carried by EAA) of 
filling import demands. 
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on horticultural exports to 62% (10%) and 66% respectively. Whether subsidies 
on airfreight of this order magnitude to expand horticultural exports are 
worthwhile will depend upon what opportunities there are for subsidizing other 
exports or subsidizing horticulture in a different way, and upon whether it is 
in the interest of Kenya to subsidize exports at all. 
